

Disrupted Futures

Disruptions to Global Health Security and the changing role of NPHIs



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WHO Health Emergencies Preparedness and Response
Programme




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NPHA


Strengthening
National Public Health
Agencies for Emergencies

Disruptions to global health security




Changing Health Risks

Impacts of urbanization on infectious disease



Source: Baker et al., *Infectious disease in an era of global change*

Crowded, well-connected cities enable spread of diseases. More close contact and fast travel means outbreaks start sooner, amplify locally, and leap between cities more quickly.



Mpox

Increased susceptibility due to:

- Waning smallpox immunity
- Animal-to-human spillover
- Increased human transmission due to sexual contact




Are high-income countries ready to learn from places they overlooked?
Which diseases qualify as health-security threats and who decides?

Emerging Science & Technology

Converging technologies such as AI, genomics, and digital health, are accelerating detection, diagnosis, and response. However, uneven capacity and governance, erosion of trust in science, and potential misuse may hinder benefits.

Artificial Intelligence



AI, genomics and digital health compress the path from signal to decision resulting in earlier detection, faster diagnosis & more targeted response.



The payoff from new technologies is limited by variation in infrastructure, data quality, and trust turning breakthroughs into isolated pilots.



How will the erosion of trust in science risks hamper preparedness and response?

New Global Health Instruments


IHR remains the backbone of global health security but cross-sector rules (trade, environment, biosecurity) shape outcomes. A new Pandemic Agreement along with the Pandemic Fund provide the opportunity to strengthen preparedness and response.



New amendments to IHR enter into force and bring new rights and obligations to the existing regulations.



TRIPS, CBD/Nagoya ABS regime, and BWC, shape global health security by establishing rules that influence trade, technology transfer, and equitable countermeasure access.



Pandemic Agreement (May 2025) has emerged as part of the post-COVID reforms but significant parts remain under negotiation.


Shifting World Order

Power and financing in global health are shifting as long-standing actors recalibrate and regional players (ECDC, Africa CDC) gain prominence. Equity debates & mainstreaming of One Health are prompting steady adjustments to rules and investments.




The global health landscape is shifting. Established donors adjust participation & funding, while other actors expand their roles in governance & financing.

There are 68 new NPHIs/NPHAs that have been established over the last 25 years, and over 30 since 2020.




But their role in EPR and level of autonomy vary immensely


EPR led by a MOH or other authority with no distinct NPHA




EPR led by a coordinating multisectoral governance body, with MoH and NPHA



EPR led by MoH with NPHA support



EPR led by NPHA with MoH support



In 2023, NPHAs requested WHO's emergencies programme to support across six areas

- Framework under development (to be finalized in 2025)

- WHO and the Health Alliance documenting NPHA governance models in 11 countries. To be published early 2026
- Global mapping of NPHAs in EPR (planned)

1 CAPABILITIES
Define and deliver on essential emergency preparedness and response functions.



2 STRUCTURES
Document and disseminate different governance, policy, regulatory and financing structures.



3 NETWORKS
Build networks and facilitate peer-to-peer learning opportunities.



- Quarterly discussion series topics
- NPHA Exchange Programme (in design)

4 FINANCING MODALITIES
Identify sustainable financing modalities.



- Engagement with financing partners
- G20 Joint Finance and Health Task Force report for 2025

5 WORKFORCE
Strengthen workforce development, including surge capacity.



6 TOOLS
Develop need-specific tools, such as normative guidance on quality standards for new tools, systems and other innovations.



12 NPHA capabilities for emergency preparedness and response across 2 domains

Foundational Domain

C1 Governance and legal instruments

C3 Evidence, guideline and policy development

C2 Financing for EPR functions

Technical Domain

C4 Coordination, monitoring and evaluation for EPR

C5 Public health emergency management

C6 Emergency workforce and surge deployment

C7 Surveillance, intelligence and analytics

C8 Diagnostics, laboratory systems and pathogen surveillance

C9 Risk communication, community engagement and infodemic management

C10 Public health and social measures

C11 Generating evidence and tools for safe, scalable clinical care

C12 Countermeasures research, guidelines and deployment strategy



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In summary

- Major disruptions are rocking longstanding foundations of global multilateralism and health security.
- These offer an opportunity to adapt or perish.
- The role of NPHIs and regional entities is increasing.
- We must work collectively to ensure EPR governance and systems are strengthened.
- Importance of function over form.

Our engagements:

116 Member states
engaged

85 Member states with
established NPHAs or
in process of
establishment
engaged

Thank you



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NPHA

Strengthening
National Public Health
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